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1 Introduction
It has been well recognized that despite the use of traditional mechanisms for
rescheduling and debt reduction, along with the continued provision of concessional
financing and the pursuit of sound economic policies, debt service obligations for
heavily-indebted poor (HIPC) countries remain high compared to social spending on
health and education (Table 1). In this context it has been asserted that debt relief could
create and sustain a virtuous circle of poverty reduction and growth, primarily by
providing additional fiscal resources for poverty alleviation. Debt relief targeted for
human capital accumulation through increased public spending on education is viewed
as a critical component of this link.1
Low overall educational attainment and school enrolment rates along with high
estimated returns to schooling in many HIPC countries are often cited as justification
for increased public investment in education (Table 2). As a result, explicit targets for
expanding school enrolment rates and other performance criteria for education
expenditures have been set in HIPC programmes. However, recent studies suggest that
it is not the overall education outlay but the allocation of investment in education that
matters for growth.2 Hence, a key element in the policy discussion involves the
allocation of external debt savings across different levels of schooling to meet the
country’s growth and poverty reduction objectives.
Using a lifecycle perspective, this paper develops a general equilibrium framework to
examine the differential impact on household schooling decisions and human capital
accumulation of utilizing debt relief savings for augmenting government spending on
different levels of education—primary, secondary and tertiary—and of spending
targeted by income groups. Government investment in education affects an individual’s
time profile of consumption and his lifetime asset accumulation decisions by
influencing the marginal costs and benefits from human capital accumulation (Glomm
and Ravikumar 1998). However, in contrast to much of the literature on human capital
accumulation through formal schooling where each individual makes his own
educational decisions, we explicitly model the intertemporal trade-off in the
contribution of the child to household income and the parental choice of schooling
involved as in Glomm (1997).
Our theoretical framework is a dynamic general equilibrium model of overlapping
generations of long-lived and heterogeneous agents in the spirit of Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987). Agents in the model are differentiated by their age-earning profiles.
We assume that parents make schooling decisions for children and there are fixed and
varied costs to different levels of schooling which are partially financed by parents. In
many HIPC countries, despite basic education being obligatory and free, in practice,
schools collect contributions from students to supplement government subsidies and
1 For cross-country studies that emphasize the importance of schooling for economic growth see Barro
(1991), Hanushek (1996), Collins and Bosworth (1996), and Judson (1998). Some examples of studies
that focus on connection between schooling and labour market outcomes include Card and Krueger
(1992) for the US and Behrman and Birdsall (1983) for Brazil, and Duflo (2002) for Indonesia. Other
studies focus on the relationship between schooling and income distribution (Psacharopolous et al.
1992).
2 In a cross country study Judson (1998) finds that countries whose allocations are inefficient gain little
in output and growth from their investments in education.2
Table 1
Government spending on external debt service, education and health:
Select HIPC countries, 1998-2000 (a
(in % of GDP unless otherwise noted)
Debt service (b Education Health
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
(est.) (est.) (est.)
Benin 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.6 1.3 1.8 1.9
Bolivia 4.8 4.0 4.8 5.7 6.1 6.1 2.8 2.7 2.8
Burkina Faso 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.7 2.3
Gambia, The 6.2 4.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 1.8 1.8 1.9
Madagascar 3.4 2.9 2.5 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.2 1.9
Mali 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.4 2.4 2.4
Mauritania (c 7.9 14.0 9.4 5.0 5.3 5.3 1.7 1.7 1.7
Niger 3.0 3.2 2.2 2.7 2.5 1.3 2.2 2.0
Sao Tome & Principe 9.1 12.5 4.9 7.2 9.6 8.9
Senegal 3.7 4.8 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.7 1.1 1.3 1.2




Notes: (a Data for 2000 are from IMF’s HIPC databank.
(b Debt service after traditional debt relief; not including HIPC or Enhanced HIPC debt relief.
(c Data for 1999 are for debt service before debt relief.
(d Group average is calculated by weighting by each country’s nominal GDP in dollars.
Sources: IMF Board documents (IMF); World Development Indicators (World Bank).
parents bear costs for uniforms and books. For instance, Canagarajah and Coulombe
(1997) find that per capita costs of publicly provided primary education in Ghana
accounted for more than 15 per cent of household mean per capita expenditures in 1994.
For Uganda, Mackinnon and Reinikka (2000) note that parents on average contributed
60 per cent of total primary education spending.
Our model—calibrated to Ghana—yields important insights into the qualitative and
quantitative effects of utilizing debt relief savings for targeting ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’
expenditures.3,4 Specifically, the government in our model utilizes debt relief savings to
provide transfer payments and public investment for different levels of education.5 Our
simulation results suggest that a country’s poverty and growth objectives would be
mainly enhanced if resources are targeted at the primary and secondary level of
education. This result follows because the fixed costs to schooling introduce increasing
returns to scale in human capital accumulation. As a result, in the absence of the higher
public subsidy for primary or secondary schooling, lower income households invest in
3 In this paper we abstract from expenditures on health and focus on education spending although there
clearly are complementarities between the two.
4 Most of the recent contributions to the analysis of targeted expenditures has been limited to a static
framework (van de Walle 1995), ignoring the long run effects of such expenditures, in part, due to the
unavailability of panel household surveys for most developing countries.
5 Ghana is used as an illustrative case and similar results can be derived by applying the model to other
HIPC countries with less than universal basic education.3
child human capital at the expense of physical asset accumulation. A higher subsidy for
basic education allows lower income households to forego child earnings and increase
investment in child human capital while accumulating more assets for future
consumption over their lifecycle. For households in the higher income classes, a
reduction in schooling costs simply serves to increase their asset accumulation profiles
over their lifetime, resulting in a higher aggregate physical capital stock in the economy.
Therefore, both aggregate human and physical capital accumulation increase.
The growth and poverty effects of an increase in the subsidy for tertiary education are
not as substantial for several reasons. First, such policies do not affect the asset
accumulation decisions of households earlier in their working lives, and, hence, result in
lower lifecycle asset accumulation. In addition, this policy has little impact on the
marginal schooling decisions of low income households as their optimal schooling
choices typically involve lower levels of schooling. We also find that the impact of a
targeted transfer on the lifecycle behaviour of households depends on the magnitude of
the transfer. With a sufficiently large transfer, a significant improvement in growth and
poverty reduction can obtain.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the analytical framework. Section 3
describes the calibration and parameterization of the model economy. Section 4 presents
the policy experiments and the results of the sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Table 2
Countries with primary gross school enrolment ratios below 90%, 1996
Enrolment between 50-90% Enrolment below 50%
Region and country
Gross
enrolment rate HIPC Region and country
Gross
enrolment rate HIPC
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin 78 yes Burkina Faso 40 yes
Burundi 51 yes Djibouti 39
Chad 57 yes Ethiopia 43 yes
Gambia, The 77 yes Mali 49 yes
Ghana 79 yes Niger 29 yes
Guinea-Bissau 62 yes
Kenya 85 yes South Asia










Latin America and Caribbean
Guatemala 88
East Asia and Pacific






The model economy population consists of two broad groups—parents and their
children. Each group consists of sequences of distinct cohorts that are distinguished by
their dates of birth and their cumulative schooling, distinguishing between 17 levels.
The first level refers to individuals with no schooling (unskilled). Primary education
levels range from 1 to 6 years of education attainment, for secondary skills range from 7
to 12 years and tertiary education ranges from 13 to 16 years. Each parent cohort is
distinguished by their own level of schooling while each child cohort is distinguished by
the parent’s level of schooling in addition to his own cumulative schooling.6 Individuals
are children up to 22 years of age (the end of the schooling phase) when they consume
as part of their parent’s households. At age 23, they enter the formal work force and also
become parents when they give birth to one child each. Between the following ages, the
child is expected to be at the following schooling levels:
Age
Child Parent Level of schooling
7-12 30-35 Primary education
13-18 36-41 Secondary education
19-22 42-45 Tertiary education
Individuals in the model work through age 50 and live until they reach 55 years. We
assume stationary population growth with the number of births per period equalling the
number of deaths.
2.2 Schooling attainment
Each household decides the fraction of time its child will spend in school each
period, , [0,1]
j
it s Î . For analytic tractability, we assume that once a child leaves school,
he cannot return. To derive the aggregate educational attainment, that is the total
number of years spent in school, we sum over the per-period optimal schooling time
obtained from the household optimization decision. The total schooling attainment of a










6 Years of schooling attainment of adults in Ghana were obtained from Barro and Lee (1997).
Enrollment rates for children at different levels of education were taken from Blunch and Verner
(2000).5
2.3 Preferences and household budget constraints
Each j-type agent beginning its economic life at calendar date t chooses a perfect-
foresight consumption path , it c and child time in school , [0,1]
j
it s Î to maximize a time-
separable utility function of the form
55
23 21











where U is strictly concave and increasing and b is the subjective discount rate. At the
end of the schooling phase, households leave a child human capital stock 45, 45
j
t h + [t+21],
the value of which is given by an increasing concave function m .7 Note that ,
j
it s =0f o ri
= 23, …29 and i = 45, …50. We ignore leisure, both of the child and of the parent.
Define ,
j
it a as the stock of physical capital held by an agent with schooling j ,o fa g ei,
at time t. If children are not in the schooling phase, maximization of (0.1) is subject to a
sequence of budget constraints given by8
1, 1 , , , (1 ) (1 )
jj j j c j j
it t i t t i t i t i t ar a w Hc z dt ++=+- + -- + , for 0
j
it s = (0.2)
If children are in the schooling phase, the relevant budget constraint is
1, 1 , , , , , , , , (1 ) (1 ) [ (1 ) (1 ) ] for 0 1
jj j j P c j j j j j j
i t t it t i t it it it it it i it it ar a w H c w h s s e z s dt f ++=+- + -- + - - - + < £
(0.3)
where t r is the pre-tax returns to savings, d is the rate of depreciation of physical
capital, ,
j
it z are direct transfers received from government, and
c
t t is the tax rate on
consumption. Household income has two components, parental income and child
earnings. We assume that the labour income of a parent is the wage payment received,
distributed according to the human capital efficiency levels of the parent (captured by
his human capital stock,
jP
i H ). Thus, ,
jj P j
ti t i t wH r a + is total parental income at time t,
where
j
t w is the rate of return for effective labour differentiated by skill level of the
parent at time t.
7 For simplicity the value of the child’s final human capital enters into the parent’s utility function at the
parent’s age 45 when the child completes tertiary education and enters the workforce. In cases where
children drop out of school, this assumption tends to underestimate the value of the child’s primary
and secondary education in the parent’s utility function.
8 Note that this is the budget constraint faced by households for i = 23, …29 and i = 45, …50. The
relevant schooling decisions are made between the ages of 30 and 44, the time at which the child first
starts school to the point when the child can quit school permanently.6
The cost of attending school is foregone production or earnings and school fees,
,, (1 )
j
it it i se f - .9 The price of child time is assumed to be equivalent to the unskilled wage
in the labour market, w, multiplied by child human capital.10 Schooling costs are given
by i e ,w h e r e i e includes school fees, books and other related education materials such
as school uniforms. Education costs are exogenously fixed for each level of schooling
(primary, secondary and tertiary) and the government subsidizes schooling costs at the
rate , it f .11 We assume that
sec primary ondary tertiary
tt t ee e <<
that is, costs of schooling are increasing across levels of education.
Schooling time ,
j
it s augments the child’s beginning of period stock of human capital ,
j
it h ,
where the superscript j denotes the schooling level of a child of a household of age i.
Human capital of the child evolves according to
12
1, 1 0 , , , (1 )
jj
it i t i t h i t hh s h
gg gd ++=+ - (0.4)
where h d is the rate of depreciation of human capital, 12 01 , 01 g g ££ << ,
and 0 g captures the innate ability of the child or school quality. This functional form is
used widely both in the empirical literature and the literature on human capital
accumulation.12 However, this specification ignores the productivity of government
education spending and its implications for human capital accumulation. In reality, the
productivity of government education spending in many developing countries can have
an important bearing for household demand for education.
The optimal consumption, schooling time and assets profile of individuals at different
ages can be derived by reformulating the problem as a recursive structure via the value
function
1, 1 , ,
,,, , 1 , 11 , 11 , 1 ,, (,) m a x () ( , )
it i ti t
jj j j j j j
it it it it i t i t i t aa s Vah U c V a h b
++
++ ++ ++ =+ (0.5)
9 While it may be more realistic to assume that the same school fees are paid for full-time and part time
schooling, for analytical tractability, we assume that overall schooling costs are lower with part time
schooling.
10 Canagarajah and Coulombe (2001) note that, on average, children in Ghana earn one-sixth of what
adults earn.
11 Note that the level of subsidy provided can vary with the age of the parent and the commensurate level
of education of the child. Since schooling costs net of the subsidy therefore vary across education
levels, different cohorts face different environments.
12 See Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1999). New human capital can also be produced through formal
or informal job training or as a product of experience (learning by doing). We abstract from these
considerations by focusing on human capital accumulation through schooling.7
subject to the constraints (0.3) and (0.4) when children are in the schooling phase and
subject to (0.2) before children start schooling (i = 23,…29) and when children quit
schooling permanently (i = 45,…55). The agent solves a lifecycle optimization problem
given initial stocks of human and physical capital. At the end of the terminal period, we
assume that the household’s assets are zero.
The solution to the dynamic schooling problem is as follows. Working backward from
T, the end of the schooling phase, the value of going to school for an additional year and
the value of stopping schooling and entering the informal labour market can be
characterized using backward recursions. The value function associated with the
decision to remain in school, ,,, (,)
S
it it it Vah(dropping cohort-specific superscripts j)g i v e n
that an individual was in school the previous period is given by
,
,,, , 1 , 1 1 (,)m a x ()
it
S
it it it it i t a t s Vah U c V b ++ = =+ (0.6)
where 1, 1 1
j
it
t s V ++ = denotes the value of following the optimal policy next period (either to
obtain schooling or enter the informal labour market). The relevant constraints for the
household are:
1, 1 , , , , (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
Pc
i t t it t i t it it i it ar a w Hce z dt f ++=+- + -- -- +
1
1, 1 0 , , (1 )
S
it i t h i t hh h
g gd ++=+ - (0.7)
Notice that by choosing , 1 it s = , the household reduces its current disposable income
(by , it wh + , (1 ) it e f - ) but increases labour income of the child and future household
consumption if the child leaves school in subsequent periods as well as child human
capital at the end of the schooling phase.
The value of stopping schooling in period t , ,, , (,)
NS
it it it Va h , is the value of entering the
informal labour market this period and not accumulating any additional human capital
in the future. That is,
,
,, , , 1 , 1 0 (,)m a x ()
it
NS
it it it it i t a t s Va h U c V b ++ = =+ (0.8)
The household now faces the constraints:
1, 1 , , , , (1 ) (1 )
Pc
i t t it t i t it it it ar a w Hc w h z dt ++=+- + -- + + 1, 1 , (1 )
NS
it h i t hh d ++=- (0.9)
A household, therefore, chooses , 1 it s = when ,,, (,)
S
it it it Vah > ,, , (,)
NS
it it it Va hand zero
otherwise.
Given that the schooling decision is independent of the asset accumulation decision, the





















Output in the model economy is produced by identical competitive firms using a
neoclassical, constant returns to scale production technology. Letting
j l be the fraction
of j -type agents in each generation, aggregate capital t K is obtained from household










Labour types are differentiated by their years of schooling attained. For simplicity, we
assume that the labour stock is composed of four education levels: unskilled, primary-
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Note that the unskilled labour demanded,
U
t L , is simply the summation of the individual
human capital stocks of unskilled parents and children who have dropped out of school
as of period t.13
The technology of the firm producing output t y is
(,,,,)
UPST
tt t t t t yF K L L L L = (0.13)
where (.) F is a neoclassical production function exhibiting positive but diminishing
marginal productivity in its arguments. Since households make the investment choices,
13 The present model implicitly assumes that the labour markets for the four types of labour are
segmented. That is, the higher-educated workers cannot enter the market for primary-educated or non-
educated workers and vice versa. In many developing countries, it is not unusual to find
underemployment, whereby more educated workers decide to enter the market for less skilled
activities. While this would result in a greater ‘crowding out’ of unskilled workers and, hence a larger
differential between skilled and unskilled wages, the basic thrust of our results will continue to hold.9
the firm’s problem is static and it chooses capital and effective labour to maximize
profits. Physical capital evolves over time according to
1 (1 ) tk t t KK I d + =- + (0.14)
where k d is the depreciation rate.
2.3.2 Government
The role of government in the model is to collect taxes and spend revenues on transfers,
government consumption and education. We assume that in some periods the
government runs unbalanced budgets and borrows. Total government expenditure
(excluding interest costs on government debt) in period t is given by
17 45 17 55
,, ,
12 3 12 3
jj jj
ti t i t i t t
ji ji
Ge z lf l
== ==
=+ + G   (0.15)
where t G is other government consumption.






tt t t i t t
ji
br b c G lt +
==
=+ + -  (0.16)
We assume that all public debt is foreign owned and the government does not borrow
from the domestic market since capital markets are typically not well developed in
HIPC countries. The government is subject to the following intertemporal budget
constraint, which imposes the condition that at the terminal date, the discounted value of
government debt is zero.
00 (0)
rt rt bG e d t T e d t












A competitive equilibrium is a set of processes for individual allocations, ,,, {,,}
jjj
it it it acs,
aggregate inputs, {,,,,}
UPST






it it it acs solves the representative household’s problem,
(ii) {,,,,}
UPST
tt t t t KLLLL solves the firm’s problem,10
(iii)
17 22 17 50
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(v) 1, 1 , , , , , , (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) for 1
jj j j P c j j
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2.3.4 Poverty
We extend the above model to consider poverty issues by adopting the Foster, Greer
and Thorbecke poverty (1984) measures. We assume that 12 ( , ,........... ) n mm m m = is a
vector of agents’ incomes in increasing order, and assume that the poverty line given by
0 F> is predetermined. If ii gm =F- is the income shortfall of the
th i household, q is
number of households having income less than the poverty line, and the total number of












 =  F   (0.18)
where 0 P is the headcount ratio while 1 P is the renormalization of the income-gap
measure. The value of a is a measure of poverty aversion and a higher value gives
greater emphasis to the poor.
3 Calibration and parameters
The experiments reported in the next section share a common set of parameters and an
initial steady state equilibrium in Table 3. We choose all the parameters for both the
consumers and producers so that our model economy mimics as closely as possible the
main Ghana economic statistics.
(i) Factor shares and production efficiency parameter: Both the factor share a and
the efficiency parameters 0 a are derived from a cross section study by Senhadji
(2000). These parameters are derived using a human capital index which is
derived by weighting education levels attained using relative earnings of
different groups.
(ii) Real rate of return: A value of 10 per cent is assumed. In an overlapping
generations setting, economic theory does not impose any restriction on the size11
of the discount factor.14 The value of the households’ discount factor that
implements the targeted rate of return is b =0.95.15
(iii) Human capital depreciation rate is assumed to be 0.025. Driffill and Rosen
(1983) use a value of 0.01; while Lord (1989) employs values of 0.08 and 0.12;
some empirical studies report values as high as 0.10 for certain categories of
labour.
(iv) For the parameter 1 g and 2 g which are in the investment function of human
capital, values of 0.67 and 0.33 are used. Previous estimates of the parameter 1 g
in the literature lie in the range of 0.5-0.8. See Heckman (1999).
(v) Human capital efficiency profiles: The earnings ability profiles
j
i H are
estimated using the following functional form:
(, , , )
jP
i H f age education family region = (0.19)
Values for the parameters are based on regressions fitted to the Ghanaian Living
Standard Measure Survey (1999). Using these estimates, we simulate earnings ability
profiles for agents that vary by age, education background, and family characteristics.16
Table 3
Parameters
a0 Production efficiency parameter 1.01
a Capital factor share 0.31
aU Unskilled labour factor share 0.20
aP Primary labour factor share 0.25
aS Secondary skilled labour factor share 0.15
aT Tertiary skilled labour factor share 0.09
dK Physical capital depreciation 0.05
b Discount factor 0.95
s Elasticity of substitution 0.25
dh Human capital depreciation 0.03
g0 Human capital investment parameter 0.67
g1 Parameter on human capital accumulation 0.15
14 See Deaton (1991) for a discussion of restrictions on the subjective discount factor in economies with
infinitely lived agents.
15 Recent empirical evidence on the value of b suggests that a subjective discount factor greater than
unity is plausible (Hurd 1989).
16 Results of the estimation are available upon request.12
3.1 The benchmark equilibrium
The benchmark steady state is calibrated to the 1999 Ghanaian National accounts,
distribution and poverty data. Government expenditure on education is set at 4 per cent
of national output, while education expenditures as share of total government
expenditure are set at 11.4 per cent. The shares of education expenditures across
education categories are set at 41 per cent for primary education, 38 per cent for
secondary education, and 21 per cent for tertiary education. The out of pocket primary
education expenditures by the parents are assumed to be 15 per cent of total household
expenditures, 60 per cent for secondary education, and 90 per cent for tertiary
education.
Given our parameter choices, the model generates consumption and investment output
ratios, wage rates and poverty indices described in Table 4. The wage rate for labour
with tertiary education is normalized to one and wages for other education categories
are obtained relative to the tertiary wage.
Figure 1 in the appendix shows the optimal lifecycle profiles of the selected variables
for the benchmark case for different generations by lifetime-income groups. Given fixed
costs for different levels of schooling, asset accumulation decisions of households vary
with the parents’ level of schooling attainment (and, therefore, their corresponding
income profiles). The desire to smooth lifecycle consumption entails a de-accumulation
of assets at the beginning of each level of schooling for those households with
sufficiently low initial incomes. As can be seen from Figure 1A, the rate of asset
accumulation declines for most households during the schooling phase of the child. This
decline is particularly marked for households in the lowest income class. At the end of
the schooling phase, asset profiles for all agents decline as all agents de-accumulate
their assets.
Given the higher opportunity costs of schooling, parents with lower skill levels demand
less schooling for their child than more educated parents. In the steady state, given the
choice of parameter values, all households choose at least primary education for the







Aggregate human capital 1.3240
Return on capital 0.0460
Unskilled wage rate 0.3650
Primary wage rate 0.7610
Secondary wage rate 0.9690
Tertiary wage rate 1.0000




The policy experiments described in this section examine how the government should
allocate its debt relief savings so as to achieve both growth and poverty objectives. In all
simulations, additional fiscal resources available from debt relief are used to increase
education expenditures on primary, secondary and tertiary education. Table 5 provides a
comparison of the various steady state macroeconomic aggregates and poverty levels
relative to the benchmark case.
4.1 Increase in government subsidy for primary, secondary and tertiary
education
The first policy experiment examines the intertemporal effects on growth and poverty
when debt relief savings are used to further subsidize primary, secondary or tertiary
education.17 In contrast to the baseline steady state, Table 5 indicates that output is
higher if resources are devoted to primary and secondary education due to higher
aggregate physical and human capital accumulation.
The increase in primary education spending results in the most significant increase in
the physical and human capital stock and, hence, output. Two reasons account for this.
First, a reduction in the costs for primary education affects households’ marginal
schooling decisions by lowering their opportunity costs of schooling. As a result, lower
income households that previously had optimally chosen very little schooling for their
child now increase their investment in child human capital. Given the sequencing of
schooling decisions, this enables households to choose higher levels of secondary and
tertiary schooling in subsequent periods, leading to a higher accumulation of human
capital in the steady state.
Second, higher primary education spending serves to smoothen household lifetime asset
accumulation profiles. Figures 3 A-D illustrate the effects of such a policy on household
asset accumulation decisions. Note that for all households, a reduction in primary
schooling costs results in higher asset accumulation over their lifetime. Lower schooling
costs during the beginning of the schooling phase (the early working years) enables low
income (unskilled) households to forego child earnings and increase investment in child
human capital while accumulating more assets in subsequent periods for future
consumption.18 For skilled households (with higher lifecycle earnings), a reduction in
primary schooling costs also allows for a larger accumulation of assets earlier in life.
Therefore, increasing primary education spending shifts the household lifecycle asset
accumulation curve upwards for all skill types. This increase is more significant for
primary education spending than for secondary and tertiary spending as in the latter
cases, parents are already in their prime working years (between ages 36 to 45) when
these policies comes into effect. The higher asset accumulation profiles translate into a
larger aggregate capital stock and to higher levels of output.
17 Since education costs are fixed, we assume that when government increases its contribution to
education parents pay less in form of education expenses.
18 In contrast with the baseline, unskilled parents do not have to deaccumulate assets (borrow) earlier in
life to finance schooling for their child.14
With a higher capital stock, the return to labour of all skill-types increases. The price of
unskilled labour exhibits a significant increase relative to the baseline, by over 2.2 per
cent, as more parents choose to keep their children in school, thereby reducing the pool
of unskilled labour in the economy. The large increase in the primary wage rate, of 2.5
per cent, results from older cohorts (with higher age-earning profiles) demanding higher
levels of secondary schooling for their children. Figures 4 A-D illustrate the demand for
schooling by households of different ages. As a result, the supply of primary educated
labour in the economy declines, which increases the price of such labour. The skilled-
unskilled wage differential is reduced relative to the baseline as the supply of skilled
human capital in the economy increases while the number of unskilled and primary-
educated workers falls.
As discussed above, the growth effects of an increase in secondary education spending
are reduced as households benefit from such a policy only in the middle of their
working life. Moreover, as shown in Figure 3A, unskilled households increase
investment in child human capital at the expense of asset accumulation, leading to lower
lifetime asset accumulation profiles relative to the baseline. Therefore, aggregate
physical and human capital stock are lower than in the previous case. Given the
sequencing of schooling decisions, an increase in government subsidy on tertiary
education only benefits those households which demanded secondary education in the
baseline (the high income, skilled groups). This policy stance has no impact on the
marginal schooling decisions of low income households as their optimal schooling
choices typically involve much lower levels of schooling. As a result, an increase in the
government subsidy for tertiary education leads to lower physical and human capital
accumulation, and, hence, output relative to increases in primary or secondary education
spending.
Table 5 also reports the impact on poverty of alternative education policies. The decline
in the head count ratio is most marked when primary education spending is increased
relative to secondary or tertiary spending. Two reasons account for this: first is the
higher household disposable at the beginning of the schooling phase. Second, there is an
increase in lifetime asset accumulation profiles of low income households in response to
the policy change. As discussed above, the increase in aggregate human and physical
capital accumulation is most significant for an increase in primary education spending,
resulting in the sharpest reduction in the head count ratio. The severity of poverty is also
shown to decline as indicated by the lower poverty indices, 1 P and 2 P .
The transition effects of the policy changes on macroeconomic aggregates are illustrated
in Figures 5 A-D. Notice that the growth effects of higher primary and secondary
education spending are more important in the short run. However, in the long run, an
increase in tertiary education results in the largest aggregate capital stock, and, hence,
output, due to the higher productivity of such labour. This result suggests that the policy
currently advocated in developing countries of increasing primary and secondary
education spending at the expense of tertiary education may be detrimental to the long
term growth prospects of these countries. It suggests that countries should not ignore
tertiary education given its importance for long run growth.15
4.2 Targeting transfers
Two types of targeting of public resources are typically advocated in the literature.
The first, broad targeting, involves an allocation of debt relief savings on social
services which are directly beneficial both to the rich and the poor, with no attempt
made to identify individuals who are most needy. The simulations in the previous
section fit this description. The second approach, known as narrow targeting, requires
identifying groups according to their income levels or geographical location. In the
latter case, the government supplements household income with directed transfers or
subsidies.19
The policy experiments reported in this section examine the implications of narrow
targeting of government expenditures on household demand for schooling, growth and
poverty reduction (columns 4 and 5 in Table 5). Households below the poverty line
are assumed to be targeted through two types of transfers: a low type, equivalent to the
costs of primary education, and a high type, equivalent to the costs of secondary
education.20 As expected, the actual impact of the transfers on the lifecycle behaviour
of households depends upon the relative size of the transfer. The ‘low’ transfer lowers
the opportunity cost of schooling and results in a higher demand for primary schooling
by low income (unskilled) households as households forego child earnings to increase
investment in child human capital. In addition, this policy results in a higher lifecycle
asset profile (Figure 6A). However, household’s lifetime asset accumulation profile is
not smoothened as parents are forced to substitute physical assets for investment in
human capital at higher levels of schooling.
Table 5
Steady state results
S i m u l a t i o n 12345
Capital 5.8553 3.0701 1.2567 1.8238 4.0823
Output 2.3267 1.2286 0.4910 0.7273 1.6317
Consumption 1.2435 0.8765 0.3541 0.5643 1.4220
Aggregate human capital 1.8954 1.2341 0.8932 0.5438 1.1011
Return on capital -3.3912 -1.8149 -0.7319 -1.1010 -2.3985
Unskilled wage rate 2.1324 1.2286 0.4910 0.7273 1.6317
Primary wage rate 2.5408 0.0012 0.0018 0.7942 1.7818
Secondary wage rate 1.5634 1.5026 0.0009 0.8895 1.9956
Tertiary wage rate 1.0932 1.0452 1.4354 0.9073 2.0355
Poverty (headcount ratio) 0.4321 0.5185 0.5272 0.4537 0.4235
Poverty (P1) 0.2212 0.2654 0.2699 0.2323 0.2168
Poverty (P2) 0.0612 0.0734 0.0747 0.0643 0.0600
Simulation 1 ==> Increasing primary education spending.
2 ==> Increasing secondary education spending.
3 ==> Increasing tertiary education spending.
4 ==> Lower direct transfer to households.
5 ==> Higher direct transfer to households.
19 While, in principle, the latter approach is a more appealing and effective way of achieving equity
objectives, these schemes are usually associated with high administrative costs to identify those who
qualify. Narrow targeting can also distort the incentive structure facing agents as they may change
their behaviours in order to qualify for these programmes.
20 These transfers can take the form of school lunches for the poor or directed subsidies for education in
the form of free textbooks or school fees.16
A higher transfer allows households to increase investment in child human capital and
demand more primary as well as secondary schooling, leading to an increase in the
aggregate human capital stock. Aggregate physical capital is also higher in this case as
households of all types increase asset accumulation over their lifecycle. The impact on
poverty in the steady state also depends on the size of the transfer. If the transfer results
in a substitution of human capital accumulation for asset accumulation, poverty levels
may not be significantly improved relative to the baseline. With a sufficiently large
transfer, however, poverty levels are significantly lower than in the baseline. As in the
steady state, the transition paths of physical capital stock and output are higher the
larger the transfer (Figures 7A-D).
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we briefly summarize the sensitivity of the results of the preceding
sections to the parameters employed. In particular, we experiment with different values
of the elasticity of substitution, the subjective discount rate, and the elasticity of human
capital accumulation with respect to an increase in human capital. As shown in Table 6,
















Capital -0.1131 0.1269 -0.1068 0.1370 -0.1194 0.1382
Output -0.0442 0.0496 -0.0417 0.0535 -0.0466 0.0540
Consumption -0.0319 0.0358 -0.0301 0.0386 -0.0336 0.0390
Aggregate human capital -0.0804 0.0902 -0.0759 0.0974 -0.0849 0.0983
Return on capital 0.0659 -0.0739 0.0622 -0.0798 0.0695 -0.0805
Unskilled wage rate -0.0442 0.0496 -0.0417 0.0535 -0.0466 0.0540
Primary wage rate -0.0388 0.0436 -0.0367 0.0470 -0.0410 0.0474
Secondary wage rate -0.0468 0.0525 -0.0442 0.0567 -0.0494 0.0572
Tertiary wage rate -0.1292 0.1450 -0.1220 0.1565 -0.1364 0.1579
5 Conclusion
This paper adopts a lifecycle perspective to examine the implications of increased
narrow and broad targeting of education expenditures financed by debt relief savings. In
an environment in which altruistic parents make schooling decisions for their children
and there are fixed costs to different levels of schooling, we find that the
macroeconomic and poverty reduction benefits of increasing the subsidy for primary
and secondary education in countries with less than universal basic education can be
substantial. However, public spending on tertiary education has important implications
for long run growth. We also find that targeting of transfers to households below the
poverty line can have non-trivial growth effects. The precise quantitative impact on
growth and poverty alleviation, however, depends upon the magnitude of the transfer.17
This result suggests that appropriate targeting of transfers for education can serve as an
important policy tool for achieving the twin objectives of growth and equity.
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Impact of increasing education spending on asset accumulation by skill types in the steady state
Legend:
Baseline
……….. Increase in primary spending
— - — - Increase in secondary spending
- * - * - * Increase in tertiary spending.21
Figures 4 A-D
Demand for schooling by age and skills of households in the steady state
Legend:
1 Baseline
2 Increase in primary spending
3 Increase in secondary spending





……….. Increase in primary spending
— - — - Increase in secondary spending
- * - * - * Increase in tertiary spending.
Legend:
Baseline
……….. Increase in primary spending
— - — - Increase in secondary spending
- * - * - * Increase in tertiary spending.23
Figures 6 A-D
Impact of transfers on asset accumulation by skill type in the steady state
Legend:
Baseline
— - — - Low transfer
-*-*-* H i g ht r a n s f e r .24
Figures 7A-D
Transition effects of transfers
Legend:
Baseline
— - — - Low transfer
-*-*-* H i g ht r a n s f e r .